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BERDYAEV'S METAPHYSICS OF FREEDOM 
ADAl\ti DROZDEK 
One of the most important problems for Berdyaev was the problem of 
theodicy: how can the existence of evil be reconciled with the existence of an om-
nipotent and loving God? In Berdyaev's attempt to explain the problem, the pre-
eminent position is ascribed to freedom, considered to be the greatest good (FS 
160),1 andas such, it is the center of all Berdyaev's philosophy. 
• • 
1God 
Drawing heavily from German mystics, Berdyaev claims that everything 
started with the Divine Nothing, the Absolute. The Absolute cannot create be-
cause it is perfect, self-sufficient. Creation, on the other hand, is movement in 
God (DM 29). Therefore, from the Divine Nothing (1'1aster Eckhart's Gottheit, 
Jacob Boehme's Ungrund) the Trinity, God the Creator, is born. Freedom is also 
1 The following abbreviations of Berdyaev's works will be used: 
BE- The begimzing and the end, New York: Harper & Row 1957. 
DH- The divine a11d the h11111an, London: Bies 1949. 
DM- The desti'!Y ojJ!latt, Ncw York: Ha.rper & Row 1960. 
D R- Dream and realiry,· an essqy in autobiography, N ew York: Macmillan 19 51. 
FiSv- éf!Mocorj)ttfl cuo6oiJu, in H. EepAJieB, Cyob6a Poccuu, MocKBa: 3KCMO-Tipecc 2000, 27-
264. 
FS - Freedom and the spirit, London: Bles 1948. 
MCA - The meaning of the creative act, New York: Collier Books 1962. 
RSRC - The realnt oj spirit and the realm oj Caesar, r cw York: Harper 1952 [reprint, Westport: 
Greenwood Press 1975). 
SF - Slavery and freedom, New York: Charles Scribncr's Sons 1944. 
SR- Spirit and reali!J, London: Bies 1946. 
SS - Solitude and socie(y, London: Bies 194 7. 
TR- T nrth and revelation, New York: Collier Books 1962. 
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rooted in the Nothing, in the Ungrund, which is primal and without beginning. 
Also, God created the world out of nothing (SR 127; FS 194; BE 106). 
God and freedom are then two different entities. On the one hand, the differ-
ence between God the Creator and freedom is secondary - in the primal mystery, 
in the Divine Nothing, this difference is abolished since God reveals Himself 
from the Ungrund, and from the Ungrund also freedom reveals itself. On the 
other hand, freedom is independent of God. "God the Creator is all-powerful 
over being, over the created world, but He has no power over nonbeing, over the 
uncreated freedom which is impenetrable to Him" (DM 25; FS 160). In this way, 
God is not responsible for evil in the world because it is freedom that brings evil. 
Freedom consented to God's creative act; nonbeing freely consented to being. 
But from here carne the fall from God's work, evil and paín appeared, and being 
mixed with nonbeing. This is a tragedy for the world and for God (DM 25). 
First, it is the problem of the primal nothingness. It truly requires great faith 
to see that God not only created the world out of nothing, but God Himself also 
originates from nothingness. However, Berdyaev's nothingness is not true noth-
ingness. It is something, an entity that exceeds conceptual grasp, that is beyond 
being, but, still, is something rather rich in content if it can generate a God who 
creates the universe. Boehme also called the Ungrund the nothing (Nichts), but it 
is the nothing which is a desire (Sucht) for something (SR 130; BE 110). Outside 
the world there is nothingness, an ungrounded eye of eternity, the eye which also 
is the will, the longing (Sehnen) for revelation, the hunger (Hunger) for some-
thing, i.e., the Ungrund (BE 106). Boehme's Nichts does not signify true nothing-
ness, explains Berdyaev. It only signifies the fact that it is prior to being, that be-
ing is secondary (BE 108). Nothingness of the primal nothingness is not pure 
nothingness. lt is nothingness because it cannot be cxpressed by concepts and 
grasped rationally; it is beyond philosophical categories of being and existence, 
but pure nothingness it is not. It is the prime, preexisting source of all and in that 
sense it certainly is something. Master Eckhart, who distinguishes Gottheit from 
Gott and roots God in Gottheit, also states in passing that God is nothingness 
and, at the same time, God understands and is the source of everything (Sermon 23 
(Quint)). Could pure nothingness understand and also be a source of all things? 
He also asserts that God's being is like nothing: in it there is no image or form 
(Sermon 6; see also iVICA 280-282); again, this cannot be taken to mean that God is 
pure nothingness. Rather, God is beyond human description. God is not literal 
nothingness in His reality. He is nothingness with regard to our reality and our 
cognitive abilities. Interestingly, in the opening sentence of The divine and the 
huma·n, Berdvaev distances himself from iVIax Stirner's statement that he Stirner 
J ' ' 
bases his case on nothingness. Berdyaev explains that he, Berdyaev, bases his own 
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case on freedom, which is nothing. However, it is nothing only in the sense of a 
reality in the natural world (DH v). It does not appear to be pure nothingness in 
the supranatural world. Therefore, "to start from freedom of the spirit does not 
mean to start from vacuity, from nothing" (SF 11). 
Deficiency of a human way of expressing the primal entity aside, it is clear 
that in Berdyaev's universe, God is a secondary entity, engendered by something 
that precedes Him; that God has a source in the primal abyss, not unlike in 
Hesiod's TheogOf!Y. God is still nonbeing, or above being, but not the only entity. 
The Divine Nothing engenders (not "creates"- only beings are created) another 
nonbeing also, namely freedom. This uncreated freedom is not divine (DM 34), 
which certainly clistinguishes freedom from God. This metaphysical arrangement 
makes God a free agent, free to act - or not act, free to create the world of a 
freely chosen order. However, if God's freedom depends on Freedom independ-
ent of Him, how does it make Him free? Freedom comes to God from the out-
side; it is an externa! ability and without it, God would act purely by necessity, in a 
predetermined fashion. Berdyaev's God is thus not free. He happens to be free 
because the Divine Nothing set freedom as a resource from which God can draw, 
but by Himself and in Himself God is not free. His freedom is a gift of a higher 
power, the nothingness. 
What is the nature of this freedom? It is an irracional entity that precedes be-
ing and so its nature cannot be conceptually described. Its nature can be rendered 
at least with the aid of analogies. Chance, Berdyaev says, is something irracional, 
unexplainable by any law (SR 95). Therefore, chance is much more connected 
with freedom than with the laws of nature (SS 113). Even in the natural world, 
claims Berdyaev, priority is given to chance since science leans toward statistical 
laws and recognizes the role of chance. Fate is determined by chance events, not 
by laws of nature (SS 110). The best pícture of freedom is rendered by chance, 
randomness, a completely undetermined event. Computer science uses the con-
cept of the random number generator. Berdyaev could state that freedom is the 
random thought generator; that true freedom lies in having an idea that has no 
connection with any preceding idea, is completely new and original, emerging 
from nothingness. To be truly free, a creative subject should attach itself to free-
doro and wait for freedom to submit to it sorne idea or configuration of ideas for 
actualization. In this, the subject becomes dependent on freedom, and to become 
truly free, the subject should not rely upon itself. Only when creating something 
by using the ideas of other subjects, or ideas from its own memory, or ideas 
stemming from what is perceived in nature - the subject becomes enslaved. The 
subject, by this logic, is free when enslaved by the outside freedom. 
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The subject of subjects is God Himseli. When creating the world, God should 
rely on freedom. God's action should be determined by freedom over which God 
has no control. And what world does God create? This is up to what freedom 
randomly submits. When God says, "and it was good," did He simply agree on 
what He received from freedom to actualize? If acting freely is to be the most im-
portant attribute of God, God should create what is randomly generated. 
Berdyaev's world, then, is a chance creation which by incredible luck is what it is. 
It could have been much worse. 
The situation does not change by much when Berdyaev calls on imagination. 
According to him, the faculty of imagination is the source of all creativity. "God 
created the world through imagination." His imagination has an absolutc onto-
logical power (DM 75). God created the world through images that emerged in 
God in eternity and which are at the same time their actualizacion (DM 143). 
Imagination emerges from the bosom of the unconscious, from the bottomless 
freedom (DM 75). For God, to imagine is to create. But what does God, and any 
spiritual subject, for that matter, imagine? If images ttuly arise in God, they have 
nothing to do with freedom as understood by Berdyaev, and thus creation is dic-
tated purely by God's own nature, which apparently does not include frcedom. 
Otherwise, if they origina te outside of God and are submitted to Him, then God 
is at the merey of the unconscious, of the abyss of freedom. If there is an image 
of the world to be created, the image stems from this abyss. God merely serves 
here as an empowering conduit of the indeterminacy, of the irracionality of free-
dom. What freedom propels to God's mind, is actualized, becomes reality. In the 
Platonic universe, the demíurge molded preexisting matter according to the mod-
els drawn from the eterna! world of ideas. For Neoplatonists and Christian theo-
logians, the world of ideas is inserted in the mind of God, the externa! world of 
paradigms is divinely internalized. In Berdyaev, the world of ideas is abolished 
altogether. God does not have any models. God actualizes what is injected into 
His mínd by irracional freedom. If it happens to be an image of the best of all 
possible worlds, so much the bctter for the world. However, freedom, bcing truly 
undetermined, could infuse into God's imagination a hellish world, and God's 
role would be limited to creating it. It just happened that the image of the world 
freedom submitted to God's imaginacion was not too bad. 
Berdyaev admits that "imagination may also be a source of evil; there can be 
bad ievil] imagination and phantasms" (DM 143; BE 175). Bad imagination be-
carne a fate of most of humans, and only a few at the moment of ecstasy can 
overcome it. Freedom submits bad, outright evil, images and thoughts, and peo-
ple, directed by them, populate the world with evil results. It was justa lucky acci-
dent that God in His freedom created a good world. The world could have been 
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evil from its very inception. But because spiritual subjects rely on undetermined 
freedom, the world was doomed to become evil, it was impossible that frecdom 
always inspired positively. The fate of the world was scaled; by its nature, freedom 
necessitated the fall. 
2 Two freedoms 
Does God really rely on irracional freedom alone? Or is God's freedom dif-
ferent than the irracional freedom? 
If only existence of irracional frcedom is assumed, then it appears that free-
dom, the most important good, is imparted on God from the outside. Strictly 
speaking, Berdyaev's God is not free because freedom is not God's; it stems from 
another entity, namely freedom. God's acts are free because of His reliance on 
freedom, but to act freely, God must rely on freedom, to act freely, it is necessary 
for God to use resources of Freedom. Berdyaev once wrote that the freedom of 
an unbelicving philosopher is his slavery (SS 10). In Berdyaev's universe, every 
spirit is a slave of freedom, which is not its own but stems from the depth of 
freedom. And the Creator of the universe is included in that number. 
However, according to Berdyaev, there are two kinds of freedom, irracional 
freedom and reasonable (pa3JMHM) freedom. 2 Berdyaev mencions these two kinds 
in the contcxt of discussion of the freedom of man.3 Irracional freedom is an ini-
cial freedom that allows manto choose God's truth and goodness truly freely. It is 
freedom in relation to God, freedom in che acceptance of God (FS 127, 128). The 
second freedom is the final frcedom, a goa~ freedom in the truth and by the truth 
that has its sollrce in God, divine freedom, freedom in God. This kind of free-
dom is the freedom of God (FS 125-128). From the first kind of freedom man 
hopefully reaches the second freedom. However, the first freedom may lead to 
evil; the second freedom inevitably leads to evil, at least within the confines of our 
world; it is a necessary freedom, frecdom in necessity and from necessity (FS 
134). 
And God Himseli? Berdyaev says that if the world and man were not needed 
by God, they would simply be chance events and, as such, devoid of any meaning 
(DH 47). The idea of the creation of the world is absurd and meaningless when 
the creacion of the world and man would be a chance event serving no purpose to 
God (BE 1 59). E ven Berdyaev's God does not rely only on His freedom. God 
2 The rational (pauHOHaAbHaR) freedom is pronounced to be "an illusion of an abstract, sclf-
sufficient thought," (FiSv 38) even though, linguistically, ratio = pa3}'M. 
3 FS 125; N. Berdyaev, Dostoevs!g, New York: Meridian Books 1957, 68. 
, 
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creates the world for a purpose, the act of creation is saturated with meaning. It 
could be stated that the purpose is also randomly generated, but this would not 
add anything new to the original possibility of creacion as a purely random act; 
also, in that way, purpose would be freedom's, not God's. E ven granted that ideas 
are submitted to God randomly, they are flitered through God's purpose, through 
God's idea of what the world should be, freedom "must be enlightened and trans-
figured by the divine light, the Logos" (DM 297). "Spirit is freedom, but freedom 
is fused with the Logos, illumined freedom assuring the triumph of purpose" (SR 
115). In this way, Berdyaev's God would become determined by His vision, by 
Logos, which exists in Him independently of freedom, thereby curbing the latter's 
significance and influence. 
It seems that Berdyaev implicitly tries to combine in God the two kinds of 
freedom - irracional and reasonable - although it is unclear why such freedoms 
should coexist, one outside God and one being immanent, and how such coexis-
tence could be peacefully accomplished. Would not irracional freedom frequently 
clash with the reasonable freedom in God? If so, which would prevail? Presuma-
bly the Iatter, and if so, what would the metaphysical role of the former be? Be-
cause Berdyaev allows for movement in God, for God's development, it may well 
be that irracional freedom is a starting point and somehow the second freedom 
develops, but Berdyaev gives no indicacion whether such a possibility should even 
be considered in his theology. 
God's creacion is good and beauciful not because of a reliance of His freedom 
but because God is goodness and beauty. This goodness and beauty determine 
what the creation is. God creates freely, but not at all randomly. Freedom works 
in God in conjunccion with goodness and beauty, or rather because God is good-
ness and beauty. That much even Berdyaev himself admits, which leads him to a 
startling statement that "freedom and the necessity of Truth, Goodness, and 
Beauty, are idencified in Him" (FS 149), although he decries "Hegel's universal 
determinism in which freedom and necessity are idencified" (BE 34). This effec-
cively voids Berdyaev's desire to make freedom uncondicional and brings him very 
close to the tradicional theology. 
Freedom should be considered God's own attribute that is also imparted on 
His creation. The fact that this freedom comes from God Himself does not make 
God any more responsible for the sins of His creation than it is in Berdyaev's 
universe. Also, it is more natural to say that freedom and necessity are idencified 
in God, paradoxical as it sounds, when freedom is in God, not something from 
the outside. It may very well be that Berdyaev was not altogether reluctant to ac-
cept such a tradicional theological solucion since he repeatedly states that God is 
freedom: "God is freedom and he desires freedom" (BE 214); "God is freedom; 
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He is the liberator and not the master" (SF 82, 89; DR 177); God is Spirit, God is 
Freedom and Love (DH 7); "God is freedom, and not necessity, not authority 
over man and the world," not a supreme cause active in the world (RSRC 41); 
God is Spirit and the fundamental attribute of the Spírit is freedom, i.e., freedom 
is rooted in Spirit (RSRC 42).4 God is freedom, i.e., freedom is God's attribute, 
and all freedom is rooted in God as its source; even more forcefully, "spirit is 
freedom and freedom is spirit,"5 that is, spirit is simply idencified with freedom.6 
In this way, there is a constant tension in the way Berdyaev treats God's freedom, 
as already mencioned, as both irracional freedom and reasonable freedom are ap-
plied to God, the former explicitly, the latter implicitly, and even side by side. In 
one paragraph we read that God created the world out of nothing, but it also can 
be said, out of freedom; "creacion must be grounded on that limitless freedom" 
that existed in the nothing before the world was created, and in the very next 
paragraph Berdyaev states that in the beginning was Logos, but in the beginning 
was also freedom. Freedom is not opposed to the Logos because without free-
doro there is no Logos, no meaning of the world. Without darkness there is no 
light (FS 165-166). At the beginning, "the Logos was in freedom año freedom was 
in the Logos. That, however, is only one of the aspects of freedom. It has another 
aspect, one in which freedom is encirely externa! to the Logos and a clash between 
the Logos and Freedom takes place" (BE 1 05). Berdyaev at least indicares the ex-
istence of this clash - between irracional freedom and reasonable freedom - if 
only in passing, but does not really address the problem of reconciling this clash. 
3 The fall 
God created man in His image and likeness by making him a creator. But 
creativity is by nature creacing out of nothing. Man, unlike God, needs matter for 
his creacivity (DM 32). Yet the world God created was not the material world but 
the world of the spirit. Matter is the result of man's fall. That is, in paradise, which 
was a spiritual, immaterial place, man could not create. God created man in His 
image to be a creator, but this image was at best potencial and could be actualized 
4 The statement, "God is freedom, nota cause" is not in SR 419, although it is in the Russian 
original. 
5 DR 56; N. Berdyaev, The fate of J?tatt in the ntodern Jvorld, Ann Arbor: University of :Michigan 
Press 1961, 48. 
6 The statement that Spirit is freedom (sometirnes just: spirit is frcedom) appears even more 
often in Berdyaev's writings than "God is frccdom." At least once he points out that that may be 
just a modus loquendi when he says, that spirit is freedom, but freedom plunges into the depth of 
what was before being (SR 34). 
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only after the fall. To be truly like God, man needed to fall into sin. Berdyaev 
himself suggests that the paradisiaca! condition of man was not quite complete 
and enviable since "ignorance was the condition of the life" in paradise. Man even 
lacked consciousness (DM 36) since consciousness presupposes the subject-
object relation (DM 12) and there were no objects before the fall, only subjects. 
So man rejected paradise and chose the pain and tragedy of the world in order to 
experience his fate until the end, to the depth. Man preferred the bitterness of 
differentiation and death over the innocence and ignorance of paradisiaca! life. 
And so emerged consciousness (D.NI 36). The picture Berdyaev presents shows 
Adamas an unconsdous ignoramus living contentedly in paradise; but in spite of 
his lack of consciousness and knowledge, he is stirred by desire to probe his fate 
to the depth by choosing the bitterness of knowledge over the comfort and secu-
rity of his current life. And instead of being commended by God for this striving 
for knowledge, he is expelled from the paradise. 
Let's observe that when taking the biblical account at face value, Adam was 
not an ignoramus; he communicated with God and was able to name all animals. 
He was lacking knowledge of good and evil, not knowledge tout court. He was pre-
vented from knowing good and evil and had to rely entirely on moral instinct 
(paradise is a kingdom of instinct, says Berdyaev, D M 38) and this was a com-
mandment he violated. He was not an ignoramus and hardly devoid of con-
sciousness. Even in Berdyaev's primal universe, where the subject and the object 
are blended together, man could be conscious of himself. Berdyaev himself de-
fines consciousness as "an intuitive act of the human ego with regard to itself"; 
consciousness, which is different than knowledge, is the unity of the ego and its 
distinction from non-ego (DM 69). 
By creating inferior humans, God made the fall inevitable if the fall was in-
deed an avenue for man to become like God - truly creative, truly in His image 
and likeness. God really did not created man in His image and likeness. He cre-
ated a creature that could become His image after falling into sin. Not surpris-
ingly, in Berdyaev's view, the myth of the fall elevares man and is a myth of man's 
greatness (DM 40); that is, the fall is something positive, something welcome. In 
this way, the fall is a good thing and its consequences are not really God's pun-
ishment for sin, but a way open for the development and spiritual ascendance of 
man. We must admit that "evil possesses a positive meaning" (FS 186). Freedom 
of e·vil is good and without freedom of evil there would be no freedom of the 
good, i.e., there would be no good (D!\1141, 297; BE 247). Had there been no evil, 
Christ would not have come to earth and "the Love of heaven would not have 
been revealed." The good that conquers evil is greater than the good that existed 
before evil appeared (FS 185). In order to bring this greater good, the fall must 
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have occurred. The good is appreciated and valued when evil is tasted. The emp-
tiness of evil must be experienced, its nonbeing must be unmasked (FS 184). In 
this way, the fall becomes a necessity, the freedom underlying the emergence of 
evil has a necessary result. Freedom constrains itself by allowing for evil. Truly, it 
is erroneous and damaging to creare a halo for evil (FS 181). 
The fall is only explainable by the uncreated freedom, states Berdyaev cate-
gorically, not by man's rebellion (DM 54). But if paradise is a kingdom of in-
stincts, how could this freedom intervene? Man was an unreflective being, and 
instincts, by their nature, are the unreflective origins for exercising an action. In-
stincts are compulsive means of arriving at a decision. They are forces that induce 
an action, leaving no choice. The instinctive action by itself is not free. Man in 
paradise could not choose knowledge over ignorance since choosing implies re-
flection, evaluation. Therefore, roan in paradise was not really free, and if he 
chose knowledge over ignorance, it was because it was done under a compulsion 
of an instinct that pushes an unconscious man toward knowledge. And it cannot 
be otherwise because man knows nothing about knowledge; man knows nothing 
about anything, for that matter. Therefore, the impulse to sin - ·ro have chosen 
knowledge - was an instinctive, compulsive choice that had nothing to do with 
freedom. Man, in Berdyaev's universe, could become free because he was drawn 
by the necessity of his instincts. In this view, Berdyaev stands on the side of 
Marxists, for whom there is a jump from the kingdom of necessity to the king-
dom of freedom, an idea that Berdyaev derides.7 
4 A creative act 
Manis God's image in his ability to create, in his ability to exercise his free-
doro. However, is creativity truly unencumbered? There are three components 
involved in human creativity: freedom, talent (ingeniousness, daemon), and matter 
(DM 127). First, there is a primary creative intuition, the creative plan of the artist 
(DM 128), inner knowledge. And then there comes actualization in matter. That 
is, if freedom is beyond good and evil, then the result of creation can be a mas-
terpiece of goodness and beauty just as much as a masterwork of ugliness and 
evil. There are no guarantees, since the smallest measure of guarantee would limit 
freedom. And freedom must not be limited. "The freedom of the spirit knows 
nothing of guarantees" (BE 46). Creativity would give just as desired as undesired 
results . If creativity is based on freedom, then everything should be expected, but 
everything is not good, everything is not agreeable. However, Berdyaev avoids 
7 H. BepAJieB, <l!ti./IOcorjuJt Hepaomcmoa, in bis Cyor,6a Poccuu, MocKBa: 3KCMO-Tipecc 2000, 
507, 653; MCA 264; RSRC 130, 137. 
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this problem of the unpalatable results of the creative process simply by definí-
. 
t10n. 
The creative act, he says, always calls upon the image of something different, 
imagines something higher, better, and more beautiful than what is given. This 
emergence of "the image of something different, something better and more 
beautiful, is a mysterious power in man and it cannot be explained by the action 
of the world environment" (BE 174; DJVf 136, 142). All creativity is love (DM 
141). By definition, then, the creative act is positive, not negative; by definition 
creativity guarantees that the result should be good and beautiful. That is, in spite 
of the statement to the contrary, there are guarantees in the world of freedom, in 
the world of nonbeing. Free action is always good, creative action always results 
in welcome results. The sphere of freedom is beyond good and evil and yet it 
guarantees that free actions are better than anything that can be found in our em-
pirical world. 
Berdyaev sees the possibility of an evil outcome of a creative act, the possibil-
ity of misusing the gift of creativity. This possibility stems from the fact that in 
the moment of creative rapture, man feels that he is possessed by a higher power, 
a daemon, and at the same time, he has a feeling of extraordinary freedom (BE 
178). If Berdyaev means here only a daemon in the Greek sense (BE 177), like 
Socrates' inner guide (DJVI 127), then this is no explanation at all because, pre-
sumably, such a daemon is a beneficia! entity. However, the statement may be 
taken to mean that man is never responsible for evil done through his creative 
actions since he is under the malevolent influence of demonic power,8 which led 
to the misuse of otherwise beneficia! results of creative acts. Man's creative action 
is good, but demonic powers force him to do evil with it. Such explanation would 
make man free of any responsibility for any evil deeds, which even Berdyaev 
would hardly accept, but it shifts the philosophical problem of the e-v;I stemming 
from freedom to the demonic level instead of resolving it. How is it that the de-
monic powers force man to do evil? Are they spiritual and thus free beings as 
well, are they also free agents, how can their freedom lead to evil? Berdyaev is si-
lent on the issue. 
5 The world 
God creates the world, says Berdyaev, but what is this world? The answer is 
encapsulated in his statement that "the subject is created by God," whereas the 
8 Cf. the mention of the evil demonic will to power, BE 221, and the possibility of deliver-
ance from the hierarchy of cosmic spirits and demons, BE 242. 
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object is created by the subject. "The subject is noumenon, the object is phe-
nomenon" (DR 98; BE 17; SR 13). Spirit is revealed in the subject, not in the ob-
ject. Object is a product of the subject, of objectification. Subject is God's crea-
tion and thus it has primal existence (SR 10). "Subject does not create the world, 
but he is called upon to create in the world" (SR 13). 
There is a distinction between the subject and the object. The spirit cannot be 
conceptually defined, but it is possible to grasp its attributes, which are freedom, 
meaning, creative activity, integrity, love, value, and an orientation toward the 
higher, divine world and union with it. "Through spirit man becomes a divine im-
age and likeness. Spirit is the divine element in man" (SR 33). Spirit is from God 
and is directed toward God. It is not really created, but it emana tes from God (SR 
34). Freedom, creativity, and evil presuppose both being and nonbeing. But this 
nonbeing cannot become an object of thinking. We cannot say that nonbeing is 
or exists (SR 34). We can only say that it has existencial significance. Logos be-
longs to spirit; it infuses everything with meaning. But the spirit is irracional (SR 
34). Spirit can be embodied and symbolized, but it cannot become objective (SR 
38). 
• 4 
On the other hand, there is the object, which does not belong to the spiritual 
world. The object is the result of objectification, and the latter is the result of the 
fall, of sin. "The fall could not have taken place in the natural world because this 
world itself is the result of the fall. The fall is an event in the spiritual world and in 
this sense it is anterior to the world" (FS 22). Space, time, and matter "are simply 
the result of the fall and of separation from God" (FS 17). The natural world of 
our daily life, the world with which science deals, is the objectified world, the 
world not created by God but by the fallen spirits created by Him. The material 
world was created by created spirits; the world is a second-hand creation and a 
side-effect of sin, and thus an ill-creation. The created spirits misused their free-
doro and turned their back to God, which resulted in the natural wo-rld we see 
today. A bad tree bears bad fnút, thus by its origin, the world is not good. The 
world is outright evil, and the desire of the world itself is for salvation, salvation 
that can come only from God Himself. 
Not only are time, space, matter, and objectified spirits in the form of objects 
the result of the fall, not only is the natural world understood as a collection of 
objects, but so are naturallaws, the order that exists in physical world. Berdyaev 
claims that God did not create any world order. He created only personalities (SF 
81, 88). The world order is a product of objectification (SF 87) and so "it is a false 
aestheticism whlch sees a world harmony'' (SF 88). "There are no laws of the 
whole, no laws of the cosmos." And the law of gravity is not a cosmic law; "it is 
parcial and relates to the partial" (SF 99), although, incongruously, Berdyaev also 
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allows for tlús law to be an immutable truth, generally valid, unavoidable for the 
natural world (FiSv 73). 
A mechanism of objectification is impossible to fathom. Did the enti.re 
universe with all its galaxies materialize at the moment of sin? Why would sin lead 
to the emergence of objects in distant comers of the universe? Thc laws of nature 
are also the result of the fall; but why such laws and oot others? Why are the laws 
of gravity, of dectromagnetism, hydrodynamics, etc. the way they are? How could 
such laws, which hold not only in the solar system but also in distant galaxies, re-
sult from sin? Man in paradise was an unconscious simpleton, and when he opted 
for self-assurance and separation from God, it is difficult to see how this mao 
thought out the world that rcsulted from his sin, or that any world would will re-
sult at all. From where, then, did a ready-made universe spring when sin oc-
curred? From freedom, randomly generated and yet strangely harmonious? We 
can easily agree with the statement that "constitucive for the object is primarily the 
tr~nscendental will of the subject,''9 but this offers little insight into why the world 
eXJsts at all and why it is what it is. When a claim is made that "objectificacion is 
literally what the terms implies - the mental crcation of an object," IO we may ask, 
whose mind is meant as the origin of creation? According to Berdyaev, God did 
not have anytlúng to do with the creation of tl1e natural world, but it is hard to 
~agin~ that there would be the orderliness we observe without His participation 
m crea11ng the fallen world. And Berdyaev states that, after all, God did create the 
world (SS 33; FS 165; BE 174) even that He created nature (RSRC SO). 
The cootradiccion bet:ween God's creating and not creating the world may 
be somewhat eased by the reference to the distinccion between the world and the 
cosmos. Very often the two terms are used interchangeably. However, sometimes, 
Berdyaev distinguishes between them when he writcs that the world "is not the 
same as divine creation, thc cosmos" (FS 42), that the world is servitude and 
should be distinguished from the cosmos (SF 95), that "there is no cosmos in the 
object world of phenomena" (BE 40). It appears that the spiritual world created 
by God was the cosmos, i.e., the ordered and harmonious world. After the fall, 
the cosmos turned, through objeccification, into the world, into our world. How-
ever, there are physical laws in the world that can be considered abscnt from the 
~os~os, fro~. the spiritual world. What would be thc relevance of the law of grav-
lty 10 the spmtual world? The law would at best be redundant but also incongru-
9 Roman Rossler, Das Wtllbild Nikolai Berdjajews, Gottingen: Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht 
1956, 129, 134. 
10 Matthew Spinka, Nicolas Ber4Jaev: captive of freedom, PhiladeJph.ia: The Westminster Prcss 
1950, 192. 
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ous with the cosmos and thus marring the harmony of the cosmos. Therefore, it 
may be surmised that the order of the world, the fallen world, is original, newly 
established along with the fall. And that is where God intervencd by creating this 
order, by creating natural laws and establishing a measure of harmony in the 
world. This is not the world God wanted, this is not the order He originally in-
tended but nevertheless the order is His work. In this, we could use as the anal-
' ' ' ogy God's opposition to having a k.ing in Israel and yet sending Samuel to anoint 
Saul and then David for the royal post when the people of Israel iosisted upon a 
king, in spite of God's wishes. If somehow objects emerged after the fall, they 
could have been organized by the laws created by God. This would make 
Berdyaev's theodicy more difficult because a case could be made that the laws 
could have been so created that sin could not have abounded as it did and contin-
ues to do. So, it hardly seems that "man reconfigured the world [= the cosmos] 
created by God in that he changed the divioe order into (natural"' through the 
fall.11 It is hardly imaginable how such a reconfiguration could be accomplished 
by unconscious subjects devoid of knowledge. 
. -
6 Humans and nonhumans 
lt is clear, then, that for Berdyaev, there are two worlds, the world of the spirit 
and the natural world of phenomena, which is an objectified world. The former is 
the true and authentic world, the latter is inauthentic, secondary, a distorted image 
of the spiritual world. The natural world has a symbolic character; it is full of 
signs of another world, a symptom of divisioo and alienation in the spiritual 
world. The objective world is the fallen world (BE 59). Everything material is a 
symbol of the spiritual, ((anything in tlús world is merely the symbol of another 
world" (SR 64). "Matter itself is only the symbolization of the inner states of the 
spiritual world, that is, of its hatred and its divisibility, and not a substance exist-
ing by itself' (FS 18). The world, at best can be treated as a symbol of the spiritual 
world. But it is not always clear what symbolizes what, if anythiog. Man is spirit, 
soul, and body, spirit being in the spiritual world, soul and body - in the natural 
world. Different corporeal events in the life of aman symbolize acts of the spirit. 
But what about the world of plants and ioanimate nature, what do they symbol-
ize? A spirituallife of animals and plants? Berdyaev says that an animal with the 
attribute of bcauty, mind,l2 tenderness, and charro has clear individuality. This is 
not a personality in the human sense, but, scill, a second level personality (DH 
ll As suggestcd by Rossler, op. cit., 134. 
12 Thc integral mind of man is spirit, says Berdyaev (SR 18). Would that not mean that thc 
mind of an animal is also a spirit? 
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151) in which personality involves spirituallife, the level of the spirit. He also says 
that allliving beings suffer pain, perhaps even plants (SF 28). \Vould pla.nts have, 
say, a third level personality? They could even be second level personalities with 
their spirituallife numbed to a greater extent that in the case of anímals, all of it 
being the result of the fall. And the inanímate world? We read that "the entire na-
ture is an organíc hierarchy of living beings. Everything, everything, stones and 
pieces of earth are living entities" (FiSv 155). Also, nature is an organic hierarchy 
of living beings. Materiality ís just embodiment, objectiflcation of living beíngs, of 
spírits of different hierarchicallevels (1v1CA 68). And although Berdyaev says that 
God could not "reveal Hímself to a piece of stone or a tree," he also adds: "but no, 
even a stone or a tree reacts in an elementary way to the action of higher forces" 
(DH 3).13 Almost certainly, a physical type of reaction is not meant here. This all 
would indicare that the spiritual world God created was populated not only with 
angelic and human spirits, but also with the lesser spirits of arúmals, plants, and 
elements of inanimate nature. The spirits of nonhumans can be simply lesser, but 
they could have been affected by the fall more than the other spirits and thus they 
appear to be on a lower level in this world: endowed with life only, as plants, or 
devoid of life altogether, as stones. In this, Berdyaev's original world is very simi-
lar to what Solovyov envisioned. 
The spírituality of nonhumans is stated, more or less explicitly, many times by 
Berdyaev. Spiritual unity between people occurs through the communion of sub-
jects, the ego and the thou. Society is a connection of people, more or less per-
manent and stable, in the fallen objectified world (SS 136). There are different 
levels of connection, but it can never become communion. Communion of the 
ego and the thou becomes the we. Communion of the ego and an object becomes 
the it- in family, society, etc. (SS 139). A dog can become the thou for the ego. 
Something new can be discovered here. A change of relations of man to man, 
man to God, man to an animal or a flower, is always an activity, a greater activity 
than in industry. Interpenetration of the ego and the thou takes place in God (SS 
141). So, communion is not lim.ited to humans. I t ís possible to have communíon 
with the anímate world, even with plants and minerals, which have their own in-
ner existence. Friendship is possible with nature, with the ocean, with a mquntain, 
with a forest, with a field, with a river. Such was the case with St. Francis. Such is 
man's friendship with a dog. Man meets here notan object, but a subject (SS 84). 
13 He says that God cannot reveal himself to impenetrable matter orto a stonc because reve-
lation is a bilateral process (FS 94). However, he also states that revelation is not something falling 
on man from the outside with man being passive. In such a case, man should be considered like a 
piece of stone or ttee. A piece of stone or ttee cannot truly reccive revelation, but even in thcm 
we should assume sorne kind of reaction proper to their naturc (TR 49-50). 
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If the spiritual character of arúmals, plants, mountains, etc. ís recognízed, it 
should not be surprising that in the new world - the world renewed by God -
plants, anímals, etc. can also be expected. 
Berdyaev strongly expresses his personal desire for the inclusion of animals in 
eternallife (DR 28), and he cannot imagine the K.ingdom of God without hís be-
loved cat. He may even direct his spiritual power to resurrect his beloved tree 
(DH 151). As he states it, salvation consists of the union of man with man and 
man with the cosmos through the union with God. Cruciflxion will continue in 
the world until general salvation, illumination and transformation of all of hu-
mankind and all of cosmos ís accomplished. If that cannot be accomplished in 
our world zone, it will be accomplished in new world zones. Individual salvation 
ís connected with the salvation and transformation of arúmals, plants, minerals 
and each blade of grass, with bringing them to the Kingdom of God. And all of it 
depends on individual creative efforts (DM 294). ''We ought to make superhuman 
efforts to secure that those whom we love - not only people but animals too -
should inherit eternallife" (DH 164).14 H owever, it is not quite clear what should 
be the nature of this superhuman effort. It should be a creativé effort, but what 
this creation should be? Berdyaev states that man feeds and spiritualizes nature 
through his creative freedom, but he hastens to add that this freedom also causes 
nature's deadness (MCA 68). Pure freedom is no cure. Whatever it ís, in this 
process man should give the stone back its soul, reveal the living essence of the 
stone (1v1CA 69-70). This process eventually enables the entire anímate and in-
anímate cosmos to inherit the K.ingdom of G od in which the spiritual dimension 
of the cosmos and everything in it will be restored. 
However, the coming Kingdom is the spiritual realm, there is no room for 
objectiflcation in it, no room for objects, for material entities. What about the 
body of men - and not only men? Berdyaev insists that materiality and corporeal-
ity are different thíngs. The other world is also corporeal in the sense of eterna! 
form, eternal countenances, and the eterna! expression of countenances. "The 
quality of the body depends upon the state of spirit and soul. Spirit-soul creates its 
own body." In resurrection, there takes pla_ce disembodiment (pa3BOIIAOIUeH.ae) 
and transformation (transembodiment, rrepeBoiTAomeHHe) not only of man but of 
the entire world. "The process can be experienced as death, but this death is not 
final" (BE 242). There is room in the spiritual world for the body, but what is the 
nature of this new body? 
14 In one place, such effort is not even mentioned; only the certainty that all individual exis-
tences in nature, including animals and plats, will inherit eternity is expresses (SF 88). 
, 
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Man is spirit, soul, and body; a spiritual being filled with spiritual energy and 
psychic and corporeal substance. This means that the soul and body can enter the 
higher, spiritual existence. The human body can be spiritualized (SR 11). The 
form of the body belongs to spiritual personality (BE 1 04). "The form of the 
body is certainly not matter, it is certainly not a phenomenon of the physical 
world." It is not only of psychic nature, but also spiritual (SF 31). The human 
body understood as the form of the body inherits eternity, since that "the form of 
the body is indissolubly linked with the image of human personality does not 
mean an indissoluble link with the material of the body," which by natt.tre is mor-
tal. After all, "the resurrection of the body is the resurrection of the spiritual 
body'' (DH 165). The body should not be identified with matter. The human 
body is primarily the form, not matter. The form of the body is not dctermined 
by material makeup. The beauty of the body is in its form, not matter; the form 
lnherits etemal life (DR 175). By referring to Aristotelian categories, Berdyaev 
saves the spiritual dimension of the body. The renewed body is simply the exist-
ing body minus matter. Presumably, there will be a similar process with everything 
else in the cosmos. There will be animals, plants, etc. restored in bodily form, i.e., 
as forros devoid of mattcr. It is unclear, howcver, how form, whose spatial aspect 
is so very important in the material world, can exist beyond space. Its spatial as-
pect has to be removed. Probably, because the spiritual world is beyond all ra-
cional categories, we should not probe into the way the pure corporeal forros are 
going to exist. This will be beyond spatial and temporal realm; thereforc, forms of 
the body can be considered bodies - renewed, resurrected, spiritual bodies. 
Berdyaev says that "immortality can only be integral; it can only be the im-
mortality of a whole personality'' in which the spírit controls the soul and the 
body. In fact, personality is the only thing that is immortal (SF 54). The entire 
human person must be immortal - or none of it. The body survives as its own 
form. But the soul? Berdyaev is not quite consistent here. On the one hand he 
dogmatically states, in which he follows Origen, that the preexistence of the soul 
is an absolute metaphysical truth (MCA 120; BE 240; DM 61). On the other 
hand. he says that the soul is always fragmentary (SR 39) and that the soul is of a 
natural order justas much as the body (FS 7). Quite obviously, Berdyaev means 
here two different states of the soul, natural and supranatural. The two statcs dif-
fer, although Berdyaev gives little gtudance in where the difference lies. He men-
tions approvingly a statement by one Karl Carus that "the soul is found not in the 
brain, but in the form" (SF 31; DR 175-176). The form again. It seems, therefore, 
that if the soul does not have its own form, it is somehow fused to the form of 
the body that makes it eternal. 
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Aman appears to be a trinity of the spirit, soul, and body, existing from eter-
nity and existing in the renewed state after the dissipation of the natural world. 
The natural world is the result of the fall, of sin of the separation from God that 
led to breaking the unity of the spirit, soul, and body in human personality. The 
latter two became alienated by an act of objectification in which the form of the 
soul and of the body became forms of physical entities. This was possible by the 
emergence of the matter that filled the corporcal form of each entity in thc world, 
not only of humans, but also animals, plants, etc. The physicaJity, the materíality 
of the world is its scourge, a disastrous aspect of the world which was somehow 
generated by sin. Human cfforts should now direct themselves toward bringing 
closer the end of this physical world, although the final act is God's, not human's. 
The physical world is a nightmarish transitory state between two spiritual worlds, 
between paradisiaca! imperfect bliss - the bliss of the unconscious ignorant - to 
the world of higher consciousness, where materiality does not exist and the spirit 
. 
retgns supreme. 
In conclusion, Berdyaev creates a metaphysics in which God is derived from 
something that comes before Him and whose freedom in not éntírely under His 
control. The original cosmos is over-spiritualized, populated not only with spiri-
tual humans, but also with spiritual predecessors of what will be in the anímate 
and inanimate natt.1re. The natural wodd is just an unfortunate side-effect of sin, 
not God's creation, which emerges to allow unconscious and unknowing human 
spirits to ascend toa higher spirituallevel.15 And with all this cumbersome meta-
physics, Berdyaev did not succeed in what he sought to accomplish. Is Berdyaev's 
proposal "the only way to understand (the origin of] evil without making God 
responsible for it," as he claims (DM 29)? Since God has all the power over His 
creation, he could so create the world that the fall would not be possible. One 
way would be to deny His creation the access to freedom, making their decisions 
determined. Another way would be to endow His creation with the predictive 
power to see all consequences of their freely derived decisions so that, presuma-
bly, they would avoid the ones which they knew would be harmful, if their moral 
sense would also be sufficiently strong. Another solution would be to create noth-
ing at all: no cosmos, no evil.16 As observcd by Shestov, Berdyaev should show 
15 In a d.iffcrent context, a hypothcsis was made that man becamc a conscious being only ca. 
1000 BC. People wcre ablc to speak and reason without being conscious, whlch d.id not make 
them rcsponsible for their actions, Julian Jaynes, The origin rf con.rciOJuness in the breakdoJPII of the bi-
camerol 111itul, Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1982, 47, 201; Tor N0rretranders, The tlser illusio11, New 
York: Vilcing 1998,310-319. 
l6 God can be blamed bccause He created beings "knowing that they receive frcedom todo 
evü from somcwhere outside," Ceprdí 11. l.Jersept'IKoB, O l.>mpoBOM 3Ae a crracaromen uepKBu 
, 
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"that it is impossible for God to intervene and . . . that this impossibility is 
good." 17 
Berdyaev does not accomplish what he hoped for, namely he does not avoid 
the possibility to make God responsible, if not for the origin of evil, then certaínly 
for spreading it into the world. It is possible to cast this aspersion on God even in 
the theological framework he created. He does it at the cost of undermining 
God's omnipotence and ends up with a faltering theodicy and a mutable God 
whose power is not quite divine.1s It is hardly a theological vision that is superior 
to tradicional theologies that are frequently, and sometimes harshly, criticized by 
Berdyaev. 
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